Journal of Creation 38(1):27–30, April 2024
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Every life worthy of life
A review of Christianity and the New Eugenics by Calum MacKellar
Inter-Varsity Press, London, UK, 2020
Evangelical Christian Dr Calum MacKellar is Director of Research at the Scottish Council on Human Bioethics and the author of Christianity and the New Eugenics.1 Among other things, he is a Fellow with The Center for Bioethics & Human Dignity, and a Visiting Professor in bioethics at St Mary’s University in London.
The book’s references at the bottom of each page are helpful, and a glossary is included in-between the further reading section and the indices. Its subtitle, “Should we choose to have only healthy or enhanced children?”, implies there is an evaluation, a moral choice, a preference at stake (p. 88). This seemingly simple question is answered throughout the book, coming from many different angles. The book consists of five chapters. The following review uses the same structure.
Introduction
‘Eugenics’ is a combination of two Greek words: eu (good) and genos (birth). It raises the question, ‘good birth according to whom?’ A historic slogan for eugenics was elimination of ‘life unworthy of life’, excluding people judged to be inferior from contributing to the human gene pool (‘negative eugenics’). As currently understood, new (‘positive’) eugenics is “the selection of desired heritable characteristics in order to improve future generations, typically in reference to humans”.2 The resulting ‘designer babies’ idea is a topic explored in Aldous Huxley’s dystopian book Brave New World, which is set in the 26th century. We have presently already entered the era of tinkering with our progeny.3 MacKellar quotes the American scientist Lee Silver regarding the risk of the new eugenics:
“It is individuals and couples who want to reproduce themselves in their own images” (p. 10).4
Is humanity poised to fall into error by not learning from the past?
History
Discussing past eugenics, unsurprisingly the author mentions the Nazi regime.5 However, the Germans were not the frontrunners. “Eugenic ideology seems to have flourished in the USA at the beginning of the twentieth century”, according to MacKellar (p. 20). Earlier, it can be traced to Britain, and particularly the late nineteenth-century writings of biologist Francis Galton (figure 1)—a cousin of Charles Darwin—who coined the term ‘eugenics’. Its proponents included prominent scientists, some of whom supported it with religious fervour.
Francis Crick (1916–2004), co-discoverer of the helical structure of DNA, was in favour of bribing people who were “poorly endowed genetically” to be sterilized.6 Sir Julian Huxley, president of the British Eugenics Society from 1959 to 1962, wrote:
“Once the full implications of evolutionary biology are grasped, eugenics will inevitably become part of the future [emphasis added]” (pp. 18–19).7
Robert Edwards, 2010 Nobel Prize winner, said:
“Soon it will be a sin for parents to have a child that carries the heavy burden of genetic disease. We are entering a world where we have to consider the quality of our children” (p. 19).8
Edwards developed in vitro fertilization (IVF) and linked his work with eugenics. He stated:
“I wanted to find out exactly who was in charge, whether it was God himself or whether it was scientists in the laboratory.” He concluded, “It was us” (pp. 19–20).9
MacKellar makes no bones about the fact that there is a worldview connection between abortion and eugenics:
“… decriminalization of abortion with the UK Abortion Act 1967 may have been motivated by a willingness to eradicate the disabled and unwanted based on eugenic ideology” (p. 20).
Another Nobel Prize winner, James Watson, recognized this too, but did not have any qualms about ‘playing God’ through abortion:
“… we will increasingly have the power, through prenatal diagnosis, to spot the good throws and to consider discarding through abortion the bad ones” (p. 4).10
Abortion is sometimes ‘justified’ by people who supposedly should know better. Ordained as an Episcopal Christian priest, Joseph Fletcher, founder of ‘situational ethics’, who later in life identified as atheist, was an American bioethicist. He argued, in 1968:
“People … have no reason to feel guilty about putting a Down’s syndrome baby away, whether it’s ‘put away’ in the sense of hidden in a sanitarium or in a more responsible lethal sense. It is sad; yes. Dreadful. But it carries no guilt. True guilt arises only from an offense against a person, and a Down’s is not a person” (p. 196).11
MacKellar warns his readers not to be misled now that eugenics is resurfacing under the euphemism ‘therapeutic genetic selection’ (p. 185). Therapy is used to treat a person with some disorder; eugenic selection is to either prevent (genetically) or destroy (by means of abortion) a person with a disorder.
The Christian perspective
Calum MacKellar devotes half of the book to a “Christian enquiry into the new eugenics”. He takes a positive approach by discussing the image of God, love and unconditional acceptance of children, and equality of all.
Little is said about the materialism so entrenched in the evolutionary worldview. He hints at it when he says that “all human life (including all adult life) can just be reduced to biochemical molecules”, and equates this with “a purely scientific perspective” (p. 102). With that, MacKellar probably means naturalistic science, as later he says that “by suggesting a purely naturalistic explanation of humanity there is a danger that it may be reduced to biological science” (p. 193).
The author clearly delineates that the image of God is not related to “functional aspects, … [as] it would mean that every human being would reflect the image of God to a different degree” (p. 43). Only Jesus “perfectly reflects the love coming from the Father” (p. 39), and this reflection has nothing to do with ‘ableism’, but rather the fact that Jesus is without sin. Ableism “includes a number of beliefs, processes, presumptions, and practices that project the normal human standard while devaluing those who do not fulfil these [physical, mental, etc.] characteristics” (p. 94). The key point that MacKellar gets across throughout the book is that all “humans do not simply bear the image of God: they are the image of God [emphases in original]” (p. 44). He explains that no matter how (un)healthy, suffering or flourishing, short- or long-lived, a child is always loved unconditionally by God, so parents should do likewise. Most parents do so once their child is born, but MacKellar focuses on the decisions made prior to birth, and even before conception. He powerfully states:
“The concept of conditional parenthood, whereby individuals decide to be parents only if their child fulfils certain biological criteria, may then represent a significant misunderstanding of what it means to be a loving parent [emphasis in original]” (p. 59).
He argues that, should such a eugenic decision (which can take several forms, see next section) fail to lead to the desired outcome in the child, the parents could be disappointed. Inevitably, the child who becomes aware of this later on will perceive, at best, that he/she is not living up to expectations and, at worst, that he/she should never have been born. These are “existential questions a child should never have to face” (p. 71). The author discusses the child’s longing for unconditional love and acceptance, especially in the context of adoption.
Another point that MacKellar emphasizes is the question of what sort of society (or parents) we become if we try to engineer our offspring; either by selecting out disabilities (‘negative’ eugenics) or selecting in favoured qualities (‘positive’). What message do we send to those who live with those same disabilities? For example, does this not communicate that people with Down’s syndrome (figure 2) are less worthy of life? Due to prenatal checks in the UK, 90% of babies with Down’s are aborted. Other countries are similarly schizophrenic on this issue.12 On the one hand, they claim to care deeply about the disabled, but on the other hand they are keen to prevent the existence of future people with Down’s syndrome. Rather, our societies ought to be like the examples of the following parents because there are lessons here about unconditional love:
“You know, I bargained with God. I could handle all this for the next year if he just smiled or if he learned how to walk or talk. A year later he hadn’t changed at all. And I remember being hit on this birthday thinking I made this deal and he hasn’t changed … . And I look back at that point and realized that nothing had changed, except that I’d learned to love him for what [sic] he is [emphasis added]” (p. 78).
Emily Rapp writes about her child dying from Tay-Sachs disease:13
“I would walk through a tunnel of fire if it would save my son. I would take my chances on a stripped battlefield with a sling and a rock à la David and Goliath if it would make a difference. But it won’t. I can roar all I want about the unfairness of this ridiculous disease, but the facts remain. What I can do is protect my son from as much pain as possible, and then finally do the hardest thing of all, a thing most parents will thankfully never have to do. I will love him to the end of his life, and then I will let him go [emphasis added]” (p. 79).
And a father of two boys with a genetic disorder confided:
“…when I ask myself would I rather that Jonathan and Christopher had never been born, the answer is: absolutely not. Though it broke my heart twice to share their sufferings, through them I know a lot more about love and faithfulness, kindness, gentleness, and humility than I could possibly otherwise have known [emphasis added]” (p. 99).
Obviously, no parent wishes a genetic disorder for their child. MacKellar explains that proponents of eugenics argue that we need to distinguish between the disorder and the person. But if we are trying to eradicate disorders through eugenic deselection, what does that say about how we perceive those alive now with the same disorders? It is one thing to treat somebody with a disorder, but that “is different from saying that persons with the disorder should not exist” (p. 165). Should we applaud “the National Socialists [who] did more to ‘prevent’ future generations of Tay-Sachs sufferers than all the efforts of science to date” (p. 82)?14 A genetic disorder is always embodied. Some people born with a disorder may view their disability as “part of their very identity and who they are as persons” (p. 83). Consider, for example, the difference between somebody born without limbs and someone who lost them later in life due to a terrible accident. MacKellar explains that eugenic ideology shifts the focus from the worthiness of life to the quality of life. Besides the fact that quality is arbitrary, he makes another important point:
“It is difficult to see how an individual with the same value system can, in any rational and consistent way, agree that (1) it is acceptable to discriminate between possible future persons but that (2) it is unacceptable to discriminate between existing persons” (p. 86).
Dutch ethical expert on disability, Hans Reinders, answers “the only reasonable answer to the question of why a disabled child should not be born is by reference to what one thinks about the lives of people actually living with the same disorder” (p. 89).15
MacKellar goes on to say that “a society which believes that life is meaningful only if it has a certain quality” may end up questioning “whether the seriousness of the murder of a person would be dependent on that person’s worth as an expression of his or her quality of life” (p. 87). Isn’t that often the question regarding abortion and euthanasia? To bypass this, an oft-used argument by proponents of abortion is that the fetus is not a person and therefore not an object meriting our compassion. British Protestant theologian Oliver O’Donovan confronts this pro-abortion argument with a clincher:
“It is a strange conclusion indeed, that one may render a service of kindness to a Nobody which it would be immoral to render to a Somebody” (p. 92).16
A service of kindness (the subject) is, of course, that which is rendered to another person (the object). However, abortion destroys the person, which is immoral indeed. This is why abortion proponents declare the fetus a non-person because ‘it’ literally is destroyed.
Another discrepancy described by MacKellar is that many people are—rightfully—against abortion if it is because of the baby’s sex (i.e., for non-medical reasons), but they advocate it if done because of a disability. Do these people not see their inconsistency when they rail against the abortion of female babies—confirming the personhood of the baby girl—but they promote abortion when it comes to a baby with a disability? Surely, neither sex nor disability of the baby justifies abortion.
MacKellar makes it clear that the extent to which we decide how far to take eugenics is very subjective and dependent on one’s worldview.
Eugenics procedures
The Nazis perpetrated ‘negative’ eugenics—a horrific crime against humanity that most people are familiar with. Less well known, but also non-voluntary, was the selection of reproductive partners for SS personnel. A doctor assessed whether the fiancée of the SS member was (deemed) suitable to further the (pro-)creation of the ‘master race’. Perhaps surprisingly, immediately following the paragraph describing procedures instigated by Heinrich Himmler, MacKellar relays that Jews practice what he considers to be a sort of voluntary eugenics. That is, two individuals carrying the same mutation, which might result in a child with a disorder, are advised against marriage (p. 126).
Another way that eugenics might be manifested is through selective adoption (p. 129). If people are OK with genetic screening and abortion, would they accept that children with certain disorders are basically not adoptable? Presumably adoption agencies require unconditional acceptance.
MacKellar points out that selection at fertility clinics is common. Sex cells (i.e., eggs and sperm) contributed in lieu of those of the infertile partner, are selected to resemble his/her ethnic background to avoid social stigma for the child later in life (p. 134). Sometimes such background choices might even include (non-genetic) religious choices!
In contrast to selection from existing sex cells and embryos, a more recent development is the active modification of germlines with CRISPR-Cas9. This has already been condemned by UNESCO as ‘contrary to human dignity’ as it truly gets into the realm of ‘designer babies’ (p. 163).17
Concluding remarks
MacKellar summarizes that, when it comes to eugenic decisions, it is critical to assess what moral framework the (potential) parents have. He argues that self-interested aims will likely not produce the kind of parents who will unconditionally love their child (pp. 179, 182): “where choice exists, there is always the possibility of later regretting the choice made!”
The US Protestant ethicist Scott Rae said:
“In many cases in which abortion is contemplated, the parent may confuse the burden of life for the child with the burden of the parents caring for the child” (p. 190).18
MacKellar also quotes Christian bioethicist Agenta Sutton:
“Any form of eugenics involves discrimination based on the view that some individuals are either unwelcome or less welcome than others. Eugenics, in whatever form it takes, means usurping powers of the lives—and deaths—over others, while failing to recognize our creaturely limitations and the fact that true perfection is not of this world” (p. 196).19
Christianity and the New Eugenics is a deep philosophical probe, not least about how we value the life of our neighbour and that of (future) children. Its author ably pinpoints the horns of the dilemma upon which society finds itself: all people are equal, but some people are more equal than others.20
References and notes
- MacKellar, C., Christianity and the new eugenics, Inter-Varsity Press, London, 2020. Return to text.
- Eugenics, Encyclopædia Brittanica, 2023. Return to text.
- Grigg, R., Eugenics is back, Creation 39(3):36–38, Jul 2017; creation.com/eugenics-is-back. Return to text.
- Silver, L.M., Remaking Eden, Phoenix, London, p. 27, 1999. Return to text.
- Bergman, J., Darwinian Eugenics and the Holocaust, Involgo Press, UK, 2020; reviewed by Woodmorappe, J., The deep and undeniable Darwinian roots of Nazi eugenics, J. Creation 35(1):29–31, 2021. Return to text.
- Crick, F., Letter to Dr B. Davis, 22 Apr 1970. Return to text.
- Huxley, J.S., Eugenics and society, Eugenics Review 28(1):11–31, 1936. Return to text.
- Quintavalle, J., Better by accident than design, quoted in Institute of Ideas, Designer babies: where should we draw the line?, Hodder & Stoughton, London, p. 73, 2002. Return to text.
- Obasogie, O.K., The eugenics legacy of the nobelist who fathered IVF, Scientific American, 4 Oct 2013. Return to text.
- Watson, J., Values from Chicago upbringing; quoted in: Chambers, D.A., DNA: The double helix perspective and prospective at forty years, New York Academy of Science, NY, pp. 194–197, 1995. Return to text.
- Bard, B. and Fletcher, J., The right to die, The Atlantic Monthly 221(4):59–64, 1968. Return to text.
- Robinson, P., An inconsistent society—An upside down view of Down’s syndrome abortion, 17 Nov 2016. Return to text.
- Tay-Sachs is a lethal genetic disease found most commonly among Jews (specifically Ashkenazi Jews). Return to text.
- Lewontin, R.C., Science & ‘The demon-haunted world’: an exchange, New York Review of Books, 6 Mar 1997; nybooks.com, accessed 28 Nov 2023. Return to text.
- Reinders, H.S., The Future of the Disabled in Liberal Society: An ethical analysis, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, IN, pp. 8–9, 2000. Return to text.
- O’Donovan, O., The Christian and the Unborn Child, Grove Books, Bramcote, UK, p. 19, 1980. Return to text.
- United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, The universal declaration on the human genome and human rights, 11 Nov 1997. Return to text.
- Rae, S.B., Brave New Families: Biblical ethics and reproductive technologies, Baker Book House, Grand Rapids, MI, p. 200, 1996. Return to text.
- Sutton, A., A case against germ-line gene therapy, Ethics & Medicine 29(1):17–22, 2013. Return to text.
- As in the Orwellian phrase, “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others”, from Animal Farm, first published in 1945. Return to text.
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